Different Wrongs, Different Remedies? Reactions to Organizational Remedies after Procedural and Interactional Injustice by REB, Jochen et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of 
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business 
3-2006 
Different Wrongs, Different Remedies? Reactions to 
Organizational Remedies after Procedural and Interactional 
Injustice 
Jochen REB 
Singapore Management University, jochenreb@smu.edu.sg 
Barry M. GOLDMAN 
University of Arizona 
Laura J. KRAY 
University of California - Berkeley 
Russell CROPANZANO 
University of Arizona 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research 
 Part of the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons 
Citation 
REB, Jochen; GOLDMAN, Barry M.; KRAY, Laura J.; and CROPANZANO, Russell. Different Wrongs, Different 
Remedies? Reactions to Organizational Remedies after Procedural and Interactional Injustice. (2006). 
Personnel Psychology. 59, (1), 31-64. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/2629 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research 
Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg. 
Remedies to procedural and interactional injustice 1
Running head: REMEDIES TO PROCEDURAL AND INTERACTIONAL INJUSTICE  
 
DIFFERENT WRONGS, DIFFERENT REMEDIES? REACTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONAL 
REMEDIES AFTER PROCEDURAL AND INTERACTIONAL INJUSTICE* 
 
 
Jochen Reb 
Singapore Management University 
Barry M. Goldman 
University of Arizona 
Laura J. Kray 
University of California at Berkeley 
Russell Cropanzano 
University of Arizona 
 
 
 
 
 
Address all correspondence to: 
Jochen Reb 
Singapore Management University 
Lee Kong Chian School of Business       
50 Stamford Road        
Singapore 178899        
jreb@smu.edu.sg 
 
 
* We thank the editor and our three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.  
 
 
Remedies to procedural and interactional injustice 2
ABSTRACT 
 To alleviate the negative effects of workplace unfairness and resulting conflict, organizations 
can take remedial action to atone for a perceived injustice. We argue that the effectiveness of 
organizational remedies may depend on the match between type of injustice perceived and type 
of remedy offered. Specifically, based on the multiple needs model of justice (Cropanzano, 
Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001), we expect procedural injustice to be particularly associated with 
preference for instrumental remedies that address the need for control. On the other hand, 
interactional injustice should be particularly associated with preference for punitive remedies 
that address the need for meaning. Confirming this hypothesis, a field study involving recently 
terminated employees found that procedural injustice was positively associated with preference 
for an instrumental remedy (monetary compensation) and interactional injustice was positively 
associated with preference for a punitive remedy (disciplinary action against those involved in 
the termination). Further supporting the hypothesis, a laboratory experiment manipulating the 
unfairness of performance feedback found greater preference for an instrumental remedy relative 
to a punitive remedy following a procedural injustice than following an interactional injustice. In 
discussing these results, we present a taxonomy of organizational remedies as they relate to the 
multiple needs model of justice. Practical implications are discussed. 
 
KEYWORDS: Interactional Justice, Justice Restoration, Multiple Needs Model, Organizational 
Remedy, Procedural Justice  
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DIFFERENT WRONGS, DIFFERENT REMEDIES? REACTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONAL 
REMEDIES AFTER PROCEDURAL AND INTERACTIONAL INJUSTICE 
 Feeling unfairly treated can lead employees to react in a variety of ways, many of which 
are harmful to organizations and may have long-term negative consequences for the individuals 
involved. These responses include employee theft (Greenberg, 1993), legal-claiming (Goldman, 
2001), and reduced organizational citizenship behaviors (Organ & Moorman, 1993). Motivated 
by the aggrieved workers’ desire to restore justice (Adams, 1965; Bies & Tyler, 1993; Greenberg 
& Scott, 1996), these indignant responses can lead to an escalation of conflict through a spiraling 
cycle of negative reciprocity (Bies, Tripp, & Kramer, 1997; Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998).  
Given the general destructiveness of these conflict spirals, companies can try to provide 
some kind of organizational remedy to aggrieved employees with the intention of atoning for the 
perceived injustice. When properly implemented, remedies can significantly improve justice 
perceptions (O’Malley & Greenberg, 1983) and decrease the likelihood of retaliation and conflict 
escalation (Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989).  
Unfortunately, very little research has examined organizational remedies as a way to 
restore justice perceptions and de-escalate conflict, and no taxonomy of organizational remedies 
exists. Moreover, the scant existing research (e.g., O’Malley & Greenberg, 1983; Ohbuchi et al, 
1989) focuses on organizational remedies only to distributive injustice, or the injustice of 
decision outcomes (Adams, 1965). However, most recent theoretical work on organizational 
justice, such as, for example, fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; 2001) and fairness 
heuristic theory (Lind, 2001), emphasizes two other types of justice that can create workplace 
conflict: procedural and interactional injustice. Procedural justice is the perceived fairness of the 
processes that lead to decision outcomes (e.g., Colquitt, 2001; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). 
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Interactional injustice is the perceived fairness of the interpersonal treatment people receive as 
processes are enacted (Bies, 1987; Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001). Given this dearth of 
research in these important theoretical areas, the present paper is concerned with remedies to 
procedural and interactional injustice. 
A second limitation of previous work is that each study has typically been concerned with 
only a single remedy at a time (Ohbuchi et al, 1989; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978; 
O’Malley & Greenberg, 1983). As such, there has been an implicit assumption that different 
types of injustice require similar remedies. We argue that aggrieved workers’ reactions to 
organizational remedies may differ depending on the type of injustice. Therefore, research is 
needed to assess whether the remedies needed to redress procedural and interactional injustice 
differ. The present paper addresses these gaps in the literature by simultaneously investigating 
responses to two different types of remedies (instrumental and punitive) following procedural 
and interactional injustice. To illustrate these ideas, we will briefly discuss the literature on 
procedural and interactional justice. We will then turn our attention to organizational remedies, 
emphasizing how each type of injustice calls for a different form of remedial action.  
Procedural and Interactional Justice 
Procedural Justice 
Procedural justice is concerned with the processes by which benefits are assigned to 
workers (Folger & Greenberg, 1985). Perceptions of procedural fairness are good predictors of 
such criteria as organizational citizenship behavior, organizational commitment, and trust 
(Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). Fair procedures tend to include the following 
attributes: they are accurate, applied consistently, bias free, representative of all relevant parties, 
correctable, and consistent with prevailing standards (Leventhal, 1976; Leventhal, Karuza, & 
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Fry, 1980). Generally speaking, this work suggests that fair procedures can bring benefits to 
organizations in the form of effective job behaviors and  positive work attitudes (Cohen-Charash 
& Spector, 2001) 
Interactional Justice 
 In addition to formal processes, research has determined that interpersonal treatment also 
influences workers’ justice perceptions. This notion of interactional justice was originally 
identified by Bies and his colleagues (Bies, 1987; 2001; 2005; Bies & Moag, 1986). 
Interactionally fair treatment is respectful, affirms one’s dignity, and provides employees with 
relevant information. Interactionally unfair treatment is disrespectful, hostile, and denies 
important information. As is true for procedural justice, interactional justice also predicts a host 
of important workplace outcomes (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). 
Comparing Procedural to Interactional Justice 
 Historically, some scholars argued that interactional justice should be treated as a social 
aspect of procedural fairness (for a review, see Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). Later research 
has called this assumption into question. More recently, factor-analytic (e.g., Colquitt, 2001) and 
meta-analytic (e.g., Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al, 2001) research suggests that 
procedural and interactional injustice are distinct in their structure as well as in their relationships 
with outcome variables.  
While the distinction between these two types of justice is now widely accepted (e.g., 
Bies, 2001; Bobocel & Holmvall, 2001), the range of their differences as well as the underlying 
social-psychological processes that may lead to different consequences are not well enough 
understood. Therefore, Bies (2005) points out that answering the question of whether the two are 
distinct only opens up the door for new questions. More research on how procedural and 
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interactional injustice differ is needed to advance theories of justice.  The present study should 
serve this objective by examining the different remedies that address the harm done by each type 
of unfairness.  
Organizational Remedies to Injustice 
We define an organizational remedy as an action carried out by an organization with the 
intention of creating in the mind of an aggrieved worker the judgment that the perceived injustice 
has been atoned for. Two key aspects of this definition are worth clarifying. First, the initiator of 
the remedy is the organization or its agents rather than the aggrieved worker. Second, if 
successful, a remedy – by atoning for the injustice – restores justice perceptions and eliminates 
the desire to engage in revenge for a perceived injustice. In this way, escalating conflict spirals 
can be avoided. More importantly, this second point also describes the mechanism by which 
remedies work. Specifically, an injustice creates in the victim a type of harm or loss. The remedy 
rectifies the injustice by providing adequate redress to balance the harm done. 
Very little research has examined organizational remedies. Moreover, the scant existing 
research (e.g., Ohbuchi et al, 1989; O’Malley & Greenberg, 1983) focuses on organizational 
remedies only to distributive injustice. Further, previous work has typically been concerned with 
only a single remedy at a time (Ohbuchi et al, 1989; Walster et al, 1978; O’Malley & Greenberg, 
1983). Thus, we know very little about the effectiveness of remedies in rectifying the harm done 
by unfairness and preventing retaliation and escalation of conflicts. Fairness heuristic theory 
argues that people use justice information as a proxy to judge trustworthiness (e.g., Van den Bos, 
Wilke, Lind, 1998). If we can extrapolate from the literature on trust, it might be that a sense of 
justice, once lost, is hard to restore. While trust can easily be violated, for example, through 
unjust treatment (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002; Van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, 1998), its recovery is 
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often protracted and difficult (Slovic, 1993). Interestingly, research suggests that how well trust 
is restored depends on a match between the type of trust violation and the type of action taken 
(Kim, Ferrin, & Cooper, 2004). Similarly, we argue that justice restoration may depend on the 
match between the type of organizational remedy offered and the type of injustice perceived, an 
argument we develop more fully below.  
Remedies to Injustice and Human Needs 
We propose that a useful taxonomy of organizational remedies can be derived from 
considering which aspects of the self are injured when one is treated unfairly. That is, an 
understanding of the types of harm that injustice creates can lead to an understanding of the 
remedies that are best able to repair the damage. Notice that this approach characterizes remedies 
by the human need that they most effectively address.  
In this fashion, Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, and Rupp (2001) have proposed a 
preliminary taxonomy of needs related to justice that is useful in the area of organizational 
remedies. They propose four sets of needs to explain why justice matters: instrumental (or 
control), belonging, social self-esteem, and meaning (or virtue). Later work by Cropanzano, 
Rupp, Mohler, and Schminke (2001), Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, and Gee (2002), and 
Cropanzano, Goldman, and Folger (2005) collapsed social self-esteem into the belonging family, 
leaving only three groups of needs remaining. Belonging has been widely studied by justice 
scholars and is of demonstrable importance for both procedural and interactional justice (e.g., De 
Cremer, 2002; De Cremer & Alberts, 2004; De Cremer & Leonardelli, 2003, De Cremer & 
Tyler, 2005). Less research has compared the instrumental need with the meaning need, 
especially emphasizing how they imply different remedies to procedural and interactional 
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injustice. Given this dearth of empirical research, we emphasize the instrumental and meaning 
needs in the present paper.  
Instrumental Needs, Instrumental Remedies, and Procedural Injustice 
It has long been observed that individuals tend to respond more positively to allocation 
decisions, even unfavorable ones, so long as the distributive procedures are deemed to be fair. 
This finding has been termed the “fair process effect,” as it underscores the importance of 
procedural justice (Folger & Greenberg, 1985). Probably the first theoretical account of the fair 
process effect was proposed by Thibaut and Walker’s (1975; 1978) control theory. According to 
control theory, people are concerned with process because it allows them more instrumental 
control over long-term outcomes. That is, it provides employees some potential to influence 
allocation decisions (Shapiro, 1993), thereby reducing uncertainty in their overall prospects. 
Procedural injustice, on the other hand, renders future possibilities more dubious and is, 
therefore, unpleasant (Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). In sum, individuals find 
it disagreeable when their future outlook is in doubt, and procedural injustice creates uncertainty 
by reducing individuals’ ability to affect important decisions.   
Control theory (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; 1978) and its recent heirs (Van den Bos, 2001; 
Van den Bos & Lind, 2002) imply that an effective remedy to a procedural injustice should 
address the instrumental need threatened by the procedural injustice. This can be achieved by 
providing instrumental remedies. Instrumental remedies attempt to atone for the injustice by 
providing primarily instrumental/economic benefits to the aggrieved worker.  
Meaning Needs, Punitive Remedies, and Interactional Injustice 
Our second family of needs – meaningfulness or virtue – is driven primarily by a “basic 
respect for human dignity and worth” (Cropanzano, Byrne et al., 2001, p. 175).  While justice 
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can, as we have seen, help us meet our instrumental concerns, it may also matter in addressing 
humans’ need for meaning. In particular, there is substantial research support demonstrating that 
individuals choose to maintain fairness even when they do not receive instrumental benefits (e.g., 
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Turillo et al, 2002). Indeed, evidence indicates that 
individuals resort to punishment when they believe there has been a threat to social bonds and 
because punishment reasserts social values and the obligation to obey social rules (e.g., Miller & 
Vidmar, 1981; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997).  In sum, injustice is harmful to the extent that it 
violates our perceptions of what is “right” or morally appropriate (Folger, 1994; 1998; 2001).  
People often react to these perceptions by attempting to punish the transgressor (Folger, 
Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005). In other words, aggrieved workers are often motivated to see 
the perpetrator suffer, which can lead to revengeful behaviors, even at the expense of one’s own 
instrumental benefit (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Bies et al., 1997; Goldman, 2003; Turillo, et al., 2002).  
The retaliation is driven by a sense of ethical violation (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Cropanzano, 
Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Folger et al, 2005). The punishment restores a sense of moral order, 
thereby addressing the need for meaning. 
According to Folger and Cropanzano (1998), interactional injustice, which involves the 
direct violation of one person’s dignity by another, is most likely to stir such a moralistic 
response. Interactional justice is especially important for providing moral meaning since it has 
been associated with norms of moral behavior (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001). 
Consequently, if a person is treated interactionally unfairly, then moral meaning is threatened. 
Punishing the perpetrator can restore moral meaning by affirming and validating ones normative 
values. This research implies that an effective remedy to interactional injustice should address 
the meaning need threatened by the interactional injustice. This can be achieved by providing a 
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punitive remedy. Punitive remedies attempt to atone for the injustice by inducing harm to the 
perpetrator of unfairness. In the case of a punitive remedy, in other words, aggrieved workers are 
often motivated to see the perpetrator suffer, The desire for a punitive remedy is driven by a 
sense of ethical violation (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Cropanzano et al, 2003; Folger et al, 2005). Its 
receipt restores a sense of moral order, thereby restoring meaning.  
In sum, we argue that remedies can be categorized based on the human need they 
address. Further, we propose that procedural injustice is likely to threaten the instrumental (or 
control) need (Cropanzano, Byrne et al, 2001) and is, therefore, likely to be associated with a 
preference for instrumental remedies; whereas interactional injustice is likely to threaten the 
meaning (or virtue) need (Cropanzano, Byrne et al, 2001) and is, therefore, likely to be 
associated with a preference for punitive remedies.  
STUDY 1 
In Study 1 we collected field data from recently terminated employees on procedural and 
interactional injustice perceptions of their termination and on their preference for instrumental 
and punitive organizational remedies. We used the context of a termination because recent 
reviews by Brockner (2002) and Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) suggest a heightened role of 
procedural and interactional injustice specifically when outcomes are unfavorable as in the case 
of a termination. As elaborated more fully above, we predict that procedural and interactional 
injustice will have distinct associations with aggrieved employees’ remedy preferences. 
Specifically, we expect a significant positive relation between procedural injustice and 
preference for an instrumental remedy, and a significant positive relation between interactional 
injustice and preference for a punitive remedy. The following two hypotheses result. 
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H1: Procedural injustice perceptions and preference for an instrumental remedy are 
positively associated.  
H2: Interactional injustice perceptions and preference for a punitive remedy are 
positively associated. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Employees who were terminated from their employing organizations were surveyed at 
various unemployment offices and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) offices of an east coast state as part of a larger study (response rate = 69%). The survey 
included measures of perceived procedural and interactional injustice of the termination, 
measures of respondents’ preferences for certain remedies provided by their former employer, as 
well as a number of control variables.  
Respondents (N = 205) were either fired, forced to resign, or indefinitely suspended. The 
present subsample only included those respondents who complained to one or more people in the 
management of the organization who could have their termination reversed and, therefore, 
indicated their perceived procedural and interactional injustice of this interaction. The sample 
was 55% male with mean age of 37.2 years. About 64.9% of respondents were recruited at 
EEOC offices, 35.1% at unemployment offices. 
Measures  
Injustice perceptions. Procedural and interactional injustice was measured on 7-point 
Likert scales (1 = “strongly disagree,” 7 = “strongly agree”). The scores were reverse-coded for 
purposes of our analyses so that a high score on any of the scales indicates high perceived 
injustice. All measures were based on items developed by Moorman (1991), modified to refer 
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specifically to the fairness of the termination. Items for procedural injustice clearly referred to 
the fairness of procedures used, but not to interactional treatment. Items for interactional 
injustice clearly referred to the fairness of interactional treatment, but not procedures.  
Four items assessed procedural injustice and measured the extent to which the person 
whom the respondent complained to collected correct information, ensured that decisions were 
made consistently, heard the concerns of all those affected, and provided helpful feedback (α = 
.89). Three items assessed interactional injustice and measured the extent to which the person 
whom the respondent complained to about the termination treated the respondent with kindness 
and consideration, showed concern for the respondent’s right as employee, and dealt with the 
respondent in a truthful manner (α = .90).  
Remedy preferences. To measure preferences for remedies provided by the former 
employer respondents were asked: “If you could receive only one of the following from your 
former employer, how satisfied would you be with each of the following?” Responses were 
made on a 5-point scale (1 = “extremely unsatisfied,” 5 = “extremely satisfied”). Two items 
concerned different degrees of an instrumental remedy (from the former employer): (a) back pay 
and attorney fees, and (b) back pay, attorney fees, and additional money. These items were 
averaged into a composite (α = .69). Two items offered a punitive remedy: (a) disciplinary action 
against managers or employees involved in the termination, and (b) jail time for those managers 
or employees involved in the termination. Jail time was a rather unpopular remedy (M = 2.61), 
did not form a scale with disciplinary action (α = .26), and was not significantly correlated with 
any measure of injustice. We will, therefore, not discuss this remedy further.  
Control variables. We used several control variables in our regression analyses. We 
controlled for three demographic variables that might affect injustice perceptions and/or remedy 
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preferences: gender (e.g., Eckel & Grossman, 1996), age, and race (e.g., Davidson & Friedman, 
1998). Gender was coded as 0: male, 1: female. Age was measured in years. Race was measured 
on five categories (Black, White, Hispanic, American Indian, and Other) and for purposes of 
analysis was re-coded into a dichotomous variable where 0: White and 1: minority member. 
Further, we controlled for time elapsed between termination and survey completion which was 
measured on eight categories ranging from less than four days to more than eight weeks. Finally, 
we controlled for whether a respondent had filed a written claim with the EEOC. Overall, 122 
respondents (60.4%; 105 of those had been recruited at EEOC offices, 17 at unemployment 
offices) indicated they had filed such a claim, whereas 80 indicated they had not (26 at EEOC 
offices and 54 at unemployment offices). 
Results 
Table 1 shows means, standard deviations and intercorrelations of the study variables. 
We conducted hierarchical multiple regression analyses to test the hypotheses. We first 
examined the relation between perceived injustice and preference for the instrumental remedy 
(Hypothesis 1; see Table 2 for statistics). In a first step, we entered the control variables into the 
regression equation. Results showed that respondents who had filed a written claim with the 
federal EEOC had a stronger preference for an instrumental remedy than respondents who had 
not filed such a claim. In a second step, we added the two injustice measures. As expected 
(Hypothesis 1), procedural injustice was significantly positively associated with preference for 
the instrumental remedy. The more unfairly the procedures were perceived, the more aggrieved 
workers preferred monetary compensation as a remedy. The relation between interactional 
injustice and preference for the instrumental remedy was not significant.  
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-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
We next examined the relation between perceived injustice and preference for the 
punitive remedy (Hypothesis 2; see Table 3 for statistics). Again, we entered the control 
variables in a first step. Results showed that respondents who had filed a written claim with the 
EEOC had a stronger preference for the punitive remedy than respondents who had not filed 
such a claim. In the next step we entered the two injustice measures. Consistent with Hypothesis 
2, interactional injustice was significantly and positively related to preference for the punitive 
remedy. The more unfair the interactional treatment, the more aggrieved workers preferred 
disciplinary action as a remedy. The relation between procedural injustice and preference for the 
punitive remedy was not significant.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Discussion 
In Study 1 we conducted a field survey of recently terminated employees to examine how 
perceptions of procedural and interactional injustice are related to preferences for instrumental 
and punitive remedies. Results show that the two types of injustice were associated with 
preferences for different remedies as proposed in Hypotheses 1 and 2. Specifically, the higher the 
procedural injustice, the stronger the preference for an instrumental remedy, and the higher the 
interactional injustice, the stronger the preference for a punitive remedy. The results are 
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consistent with our theorizing that procedural and interactional injustice lead to preferences for 
different remedies because these remedies address the different justice needs evoked. 
Limitations 
While Study 1 yielded important findings regarding the relation between type of injustice 
and preferences for different remedies of recently terminated employees, as a cross-sectional 
field survey, the study has several limitations, especially with respect to internal validity and the 
possibility of drawing causal inferences. The purpose of Study 2 was to examine the effects of 
procedural and interactional injustice on remedy preferences in a much more tightly controlled 
laboratory experiment. Also, in Study 1 no actual remedies were provided and injustice 
perceptions were not measured repeatedly. Therefore, the study did not speak to whether 
remedies can actually improve justice perceptions. A second purpose of Study 2, thus, was to 
examine the effect of receiving a remedy on subsequent justice perceptions.  
STUDY 2 
In the present experiment participants engaged in three business task simulations with the 
expectation of receiving a monetary reward depending on their performance. They received 
performance feedback after each task. Whereas feedback to the first and third task was relatively 
fair, feedback to the second task was manipulated to be either procedurally or interactionally 
unfair. Following the unfair feedback, participants were given a choice between an instrumental 
and a punitive remedy. They could choose between various combinations of these two remedies 
with the extremes being choice of a purely instrumental and a purely punitive remedy. Based on 
the theorizing described in the introduction, we predicted that participants’ preference for the 
instrumental remedy over the punitive remedy would be stronger after procedural than 
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interactional injustice. Because of the forced-choice nature of our single dependent variable, the 
theoretical prediction is captured in the following single hypothesis. 
H3: An instrumental remedy is preferred more over a punitive remedy after procedural 
injustice than after interactional injustice.   
Restoration of Justice Perceptions through Remedy Provision 
Study 2 also set out to examine an additional question. We have argued that 
organizational remedies, if successful, restore justice perceptions (O’Malley & Greenberg, 
1983). In order to test this hypothesis, we established an additional baseline by including a 
control condition in which participants were not given a remedy following the procedural or 
interactionally unfair performance feedback messages to the second task (no remedy condition). 
We predict that, as compared to the no remedy condition, justice perceptions would be higher in 
the remedy condition, in which participants could choose between the instrumental and punitive 
remedy. Specifically, we expect procedural justice perceptions following procedurally unfair 
performance feedback to be higher in the remedy condition than in the no remedy condition. (We 
do not expect a significant improvement in interactional justice perceptions because these 
perceptions are not likely to be as negatively affected by the procedurally unfair feedback in the 
first place.) Analogously, we expect interactional justice perceptions following interactionally 
unfair performance feedback to be higher in the remedy condition than in the no remedy 
condition. (For the same reason as above we do not expect this pattern to hold for procedural 
justice perceptions.) To be consistent with previous parts of this manuscript, we state the two 
hypotheses in terms of injustice perceptions. 
H4: Procedural injustice perceptions following a procedural injustice will be improved 
by receiving a remedy as compared to not receiving a remedy. 
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H5: Interactional injustice perceptions following an interactional injustice will be 
improved by receiving a remedy as compared to not receiving a remedy. 
The above hypotheses compare receiving a preferred remedy with not receiving any 
remedy at all. A second comparison takes into account participants’ preference for the 
instrumental remedy relative to the punitive remedy. If our theoretical reasoning is correct, the 
more participants preferred the instrumental remedy over the punitive remedy, the more should 
their procedural injustice perceptions improve from the time they received unfair feedback to 
when they received a remedy. Similarly, the more participants preferred the punitive remedy 
over the instrumental remedy, the more should their interactional justice perceptions improve 
from the time they received unfair feedback to when they received a remedy. Thus, we 
hypothesize (again, in terms of injustice to be consistent) the following.   
H6: Preference for an instrumental remedy over a punitive remedy is positively 
associated with improvement of procedural injustice perceptions. 
H7: Preference for a punitive remedy over an instrumental remedy is positively 
associated with improvement of interactional injustice perceptions. 
Method 
Overview, design and participants. Participants assumed the role of employees and 
performed three work tasks on a computer. They received equally unfavorable and either 
procedurally or interactionally unfair task feedback on the second task and accurate and 
relatively fair feedback on the first and third task, presumably from their supervisor. After the 
unfair feedback participants in the remedy condition were offered a choice of remedy that either 
consisted in some monetary payoff to them (instrumental remedy) or some deduction of the 
monetary payoff to the unfair supervisor (punitive remedy) or any desired combination of these 
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two types of remedies (dependent variable used to test Hypothesis 3). Participants in the no 
remedy condition were not provided with a remedy. After each performance feedback, 
participants indicated their procedural and interactional injustice perceptions (dependent 
variables used to test Hypotheses 4-7).  
Participants were 114 undergraduate students from a large Southwestern public university 
with an average age of 22.4 years, 51% of whom were male. They all received course credit and 
monetary compensation for participation. 
Procedure and manipulation. Upon entering the laboratory, participants were told that 
they would participate in a business simulation for a study on work climate and work 
performance and that they would be randomly assigned to the role of employee or supervisor. 
Employees were required to work on three business-related tasks and submit their work to their 
supervisor who would evaluate their performance, assign points for their work, and give them 
feedback. In reality, all participants were assigned the role of employee and the feedback was a 
pre-programmed response. After each task, participants filled out an “employee survey” to 
measure “work climate”. This survey contained, among distractor items, measures of procedural 
and interactional injustice perceptions. 
Participants were told that their payoff would be determined by their performance as 
evaluated by the supervisor and could reach $2 for each task, and $6 in total. Also, participants 
learned that the supervisor’s performance and payoff would be determined by the experimenter. 
All participants worked on computers in individual rooms. Participants were told that 
communication between employee, supervisor, and experimenter would take place via the 
computer network.  
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The computerized tasks were a modified version of a business simulation described in 
Lind, Kray, and Thompson (1998). Each participant, in the role of employee, performed three 
tasks ranging from five to six minutes. Employees could earn up to 100 points on each task, 
which participants learned translated into U.S. dollars in a 50 to 1 ratio (100 points was 
equivalent to $2). After completing a task, participants received a message with feedback from 
the supervisor. The feedback messages to the first task (a routing task of incoming requests to the 
correct department) and the third task (a scheduling task of a meeting of five managers from 
different divisions) stated the actual number of correct answers and the points earned and were 
relatively fair. Specifically, the first message read in all conditions: “Hi this is your supervisor. 
You got [number of correct answers] answers correct. That means you earned [x] out of 100 
points. I’m looking forward to receiving your next work. Good luck!” The third message read in 
all conditions: “You got [number of correct answers] answers correct, which means that I give 
you [x] points for his task. I hope this is acceptable to you.”  
The feedback message to the second task contained the experimental manipulation of 
injustice type. The task consisted in writing an outline for a presentation of the company’s CEO. 
This task was selected because no obvious performance standard exists and, therefore, our 
feedback manipulation would not appear suspicious. One of four feedback messages was 
randomly selected for each participant. The two feedback messages for the procedural injustice 
condition were (a) “Unfortunately, I didn't have a chance to look at your work because I was too 
busy” and (b) “I decided to assign points randomly, rather than review your work.” The two 
feedback messages for the interactional injustice condition were (a) “Your work doesn't meet my 
standards. Can't you do a better job?” and (b) “Your work really stinks. I mean, it is lousy. You 
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need to get your act together.” In all conditions, participants were given 20 out of 100 points for 
this task. 
The feedback messages had been selected based on a pretest (N = 39). We included two 
messages for each type of injustice to guard better against spurious effects. Pretest participants 
rated the four messages with respect to their procedural and interactional fairness on three-item 
scales each using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”). We first 
conducted principal components analyses to examine whether it is appropriate to collapse across 
the two messages (for each type of injustice). We analyzed all twelve items (three for each 
message) measuring perceived procedural injustice (using Varimax rotation and setting the 
number of components to be extracted to 2). Consistent with our expectations, all six items of the 
two messages intended as procedural injustice manipulations loaded on one factor, the other six 
items on the other (minimum loading on factor = .68, maximum cross-loading on other factor = 
.39). We next analyzed in the same way all twelve items measuring interactional injustice. 
Again, the twelve items split along the six items for the two messages intended as procedural 
injustice manipulation on the one side, and the six items for the two messages intended as 
interactional injustice manipulation on the other side (minimum loading on factor = .63, 
maximum cross-loading on other factor = .47). To further examine whether the feedback 
messages differed in the type of injustice manipulated we conducted several paired-sample t-
tests. Results showed that the two interactionally unfair feedback messages were each considered 
significantly more interactionally unfair than procedurally unfair and the reverse was true for 
each of the two procedurally unfair feedback messages (minimum t = 4.93; p < .001 for all 
paired-samples t-tests). On a separate sample (N = 31) we tested whether the procedural and 
interactionally unfair feedback messages were perceived as equally severe as we intended. On 
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two different measures concerning the extent to which the feedback was (1) severe and (2) a bad 
outcome, paired-sample t-tests did not find significant differences between the procedural and 
interactional injustice conditions (t = .34 and t = .74, respectively). 
While working on the third task participants received a message from the experimenter as 
the superior authority stating that he had read the supervisor’s feedback message and thought that 
it should not have been written as it was. In the remedy condition only (N = 78), the 
experimenter’s message went on to state that similar problems in the past had been solved by 
giving the employee a choice between adding up to 100 points ($2) to his or her account 
(instrumental remedy), or subtracting up to 100 points ($2) from the supervisor’s account 
(punitive remedy), or any mixture of the two that resulted in the distribution of the 100 points. In 
counterbalanced order, participants then entered the number of points to be added to their 
account and the number of points to be subtracted from the supervisor’s account and the program 
checked that the two add up to 100. No remedy was offered in the no remedy condition (N = 36). 
All participants then returned to the third task. In the remedy condition only, participants soon 
received a second message from the experimenter and were told that the points had been 
distributed as requested. After finishing the third task, participants filled out another employee 
survey. At the end of the experiment, they were fully debriefed. At this time all participants 
received $6, the amount for optimal performance. 
Measures. Our preference measure was changed somewhat from Study 1. In Study 1 
participants rated the expected satisfaction provided by each remedy on separate scales. In Study 
2, participants had to decide between the two remedies such that choosing more of one 
automatically meant choosing less of the other, thus putting the two remedies into direct 
competition with each other. Preference for the remedies was measured as the difference 
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between the number of points asked for oneself and the number of points asked to be subtracted 
from the supervisor. Thus, this measure could range from +100 to –100, with any number > 0 
indicating stronger preference for the instrumental remedy. 
Procedural and interactional injustice in the “employee survey” were measured with three 
items each on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7 = “strongly agree”). The items 
were selected such that procedural justice items clearly referred to procedures, but not 
interpersonal treatment and interactional items clearly referred to interpersonal treatment, but not 
procedures. Procedural justice items assessed the extent to which participants perceived that they 
had influence on the performance points received, that the procedures used to assess performance 
were fair, and that performance was determined based on accurate information (α = .91). 
Interactional justice items assessed the extent to which employees felt that the supervisor treated 
them in a polite manner, with dignity, and refrained from improper remarks or comments (α = 
.83). The scales were reverse-scored so that higher values indicate higher perceived injustice.  
We assessed perceptions of procedural and interactional injustice at three points of time: 
(1) before the injustice occurred (and after the feedback to the first task), (2) after the 
manipulated unfair feedback to the second task, and (3) after the feedback to the third task. At 
Time 3, participants in the remedy condition had received their chosen remedy, whereas those in 
the no remedy condition had not received a remedy. Procedural and interactional injustice were 
correlated at Time 1 r = .59, p < .001, at Time 2 r = .30, p = .001, and at Time 3 r = .53, p < .001. 
Thus, while moderately correlated, the scales clearly measured distinct constructs. As one would 
expect, the correlation was lowest at Time 2 after the manipulation was administered.  
Results 
Table 4 shows means, standard deviations and intercorrelations of the study variables. 
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Manipulation check. Our manipulation of perceived procedural and interactional injustice 
through either procedurally or interactionally unfair feedback to the second task was successful 
(see also Figures 1a and 1b). Between-subjects ANOVAs showed that perceived procedural 
injustice was higher in the procedural injustice condition (M = 5.89) than in the interactional 
injustice condition (M = 4.58), F(1, 110) = 29.96, p < .001. In contrast, perceived interactional 
injustice was higher after interactionally unfair feedback (M = 5.36) than after procedurally 
unfair feedback (M = 4.51), F(1, 110) = 7.31, p < .01. Also, paired-samples t-tests revealed that 
participants receiving procedurally unfair feedback rated the message significantly more 
procedurally unfair (M = 5.89) than interactionally unfair (M = 4.51), t(56) = 6.38, p < .001. In 
contrast, in the interactional injustice condition, perceived interactional injustice (M  = 5.36) was 
higher than perceived procedural injustice (M = 4.58), t(54) = 4.67, p < .001. In addition, 
between-subjects ANOVAs comparing the two procedurally unfair feedback messages showed 
no differences in procedural or interactional injustice perceptions (ps > .1). The same was the 
case for the two interactionally unfair feedback messages (ps > .1) suggesting that it is 
appropriate to collapse across the two messages within each injustice condition.  
Preference for remedies. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, Analysis of Covariance 
(ANCOVA) with type of injustice as a between-subjects factor and gender as a covariate 
revealed a significant main effect for type of injustice, F(1, 72) = 5.18, p < .05.1 Participants in 
the procedural injustice condition (M = 59.16) exhibited a stronger preference for an instrumental 
remedy over a punitive remedy than did participants in the interactional injustice condition (M = 
42.00).  
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-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Improvement of injustice perceptions. In order to test Hypotheses 4 and 5, we analyzed 
injustice perceptions at Time 3 using ANOVAs with remedy condition as between-subjects 
factor. When the feedback was procedurally unfair, ANOVA revealed no significant difference 
between procedural injustice perceptions depending on whether a remedy was given (M = 3.47) 
or not (M = 3.56), F(1, 57) = .04, ns (see Figure 1a). Thus, Hypothesis 4 was rejected. Additional 
analyses showed that remedy condition also did not affect interactional injustice perceptions, 
F(1, 57) = .82, ns. 
When feedback was interactionally unfair, ANOVA showed a significant effect of 
remedy condition on interactional injustice perceptions, F(1, 53) = 6.82, p = .01 (see Figure 1b). 
When a remedy was received (M = 3.02) justice perceptions were improved as compared to 
when no remedy was received (M = 4.02). Thus, Hypothesis 5 was supported. Additional 
analyses showed that remedy condition did not affect perceptions of procedural injustice, F(1, 
53) = .42, ns. Also, interactional injustice perceptions did not differ significantly depending on 
remedy condition at Time 2, F(1, 53) = .48, ns, and Time 1, F(1, 52) = 1.01, ns. Thus, the effect 
of receiving a remedy on improving justice perceptions after interactional injustice was specific 
to interactional injustice perceptions and was not due to differences in interactional injustice 
perceptions pre-existing to the implementation of the remedy manipulation.    
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1a and Figure 1b about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
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 To test Hypotheses 6 and 7, we first calculated two difference scores by subtracting, 
respectively, procedural and interactional injustice perceptions at Time 2 (after the unfair 
feedback) from Time 3 (after the remedy was received). We then correlated these measures with 
the preference measure. Consistent with Hypothesis 6, the more participants preferred the 
instrumental remedy over the punitive remedy, the more did their procedural injustice 
perceptions improve from Time 2 to Time 3, r(78) = -.23, p ≤ .05. Consistent with Hypothesis 7, 
the more participants preferred the punitive remedy over the instrumental remedy, the more did 
their interactional injustice perceptions improve from Time 2 to Time 3, r(76) = .23, p ≤ .05. 
Discussion 
 Study 2 had two important purposes. First, the experiment examined the effect of type of 
injustice experienced on relative preference between an instrumental and a punitive remedy. We 
manipulated whether participants received procedurally or interactionally unfair performance 
feedback and then measured participants’ relative preference for the two remedies using a 
forced-choice measure. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we found that participants who were given 
a choice of remedy preferred an instrumental remedy relatively more strongly over a punitive 
remedy after receiving procedurally unfair feedback (as compared to when they received 
interactionally unfair feedback). The results of this laboratory experiment complement the 
findings of the field survey reported in Study 1. 
Second, the study examined the role of remedies in restoring justice perception. To do so, 
we (1) manipulated whether participants received a remedy or not and tested the effect of 
receiving a preferred remedy (or not) on subsequent justice perceptions, and (2) examined the 
relation between the relative preference for one type of remedy over the other with improvement 
in procedural and interactional justice perceptions, respectively.  
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With respect to the first issue, interestingly, the effect of receiving a remedy differed 
depending on the type of injustice experienced. In the interactional injustice condition, those 
receiving a remedy (regardless of which remedy was chosen) showed higher interactional justice 
perceptions than those not receiving a remedy. However, when the feedback was procedurally 
unfair, receiving a remedy did not lead to significantly higher procedural injustice perceptions 
than not receiving a remedy. In our experiment, participants received only a single unfair 
feedback (to the second task) but received accurate and relatively fair feedback to the first and 
third task before injustice perceptions at Time 3 were assessed. Thus, it appears that only after 
the interactionally unfair feedback (but not after the procedurally unfair feedback) did receiving 
a remedy improve injustice perceptions over and above the effects of the subsequent fair 
feedback. Implementing only a single unfair feedback preceded and followed by fair feedback 
constitutes a conservative test of the need for remedies in restoring justice perceptions. While 
experiencing a single injustice is an important case (as injustice is likely the exception rather 
than the norm in most workplaces) the results suggest that a fruitful direction for future research 
would be to investigate the role of remedies in restoring fairness perceptions after repeated unfair 
incidents, which might require stronger and/or different remedies.  
Because we did not manipulate which remedy participants received, as we were 
interested in their choice of remedy, we could not test any experimental effect of type of remedy 
on subsequent remedy preferences. However, it was still possible to correlate participants’ 
remedy preferences with subsequent procedural and interactional justice perceptions. When 
doing so we found, as expected, that those who preferred the instrumental remedy relatively 
more strongly over the punitive remedy tended to have higher subsequent procedural justice 
perceptions, whereas those who preferred the instrumental remedy relatively less over the 
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punitive remedy tended to have higher subsequent interactional justice perceptions. In other 
words, consistent with our theorizing, receiving an instrumental or punitive remedy seemed to 
particularly improve the matching justice perceptions (procedural and interactional, 
respectively).   
Limitations 
Study 2 allowed us to establish a causal relationship between the type of injustice and 
preference for remedies because of the experimental control over the type of injustice 
experienced. In this manner it complements and extends the findings of Study 1. A possible 
shortcoming of this study is that, perhaps, participants did not take the feedback messages 
seriously because the stakes were quite low. Although we have no evidence that this was the case 
(i.e., when asked after the experiment participants did not say so), this tendency would actually 
work against the prediction of a main effect for type of injustice. Any participant who did not 
take the study seriously can be expected to give the 100 points, or $2 of real money, to him- or 
herself. Indeed, we did find that overall preference for the instrumental remedy was substantially 
stronger than for the punitive remedy (M = 50.36), t(77) = 9.62, p < .001, consistent with this 
possibility. Thus, this tendency would have made our significance test more conservative. 
Nevertheless, we did find a significant effect for type of injustice, and a substantial number of 
participants were willing to give up real money, and more so in the interactional than the 
procedural injustice condition.  
Another aspect of the present experiment might have led to the overall preference for an 
instrumental remedy. Notice that Study 1 and Study 2 differ in that in the latter the organization 
(i.e., the experimenter) had admitted fault before a remedy was offered whereas in the former it 
had not admitted fault. It might be that demanding punishment after an admission of wrongdoing 
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(even though not from the wrongdoer him- or herself, but the superordinate authority) appeared 
less justified (or “too mean”) to participants. Future research should examine in more detail the 
effect of admission of wrongdoing and guilt from the wrongdoer (e.g., supervisor) and/or the 
superordinate authority (i.e., organization) on remedy preferences. 
Because our main interest in this experiment was to test the effect of type of injustice on 
remedy preferences, participants were allowed to choose their preferred remedy, rather than 
being randomly assigned to receive an instrumental or a punitive remedy. As a consequence, we 
could not assess the experimental effect of receiving an instrumental or a punitive remedy 
specifically on subsequent procedural and interactional justice perceptions, but only conduct 
correlational analyses linking remedy preferences to subsequent justice perceptions. In our study, 
participants either received their preferred remedy or no remedy at all, which allowed us to 
examine the effect of receiving a remedy on justice restoration. Future research could 
experimentally manipulate both type of injustice (procedural versus interactional) and type of 
remedy received (instrumental versus punitive).  
Finally, whereas Study 1 measured preference for the instrumental and punitive remedies 
on two separate scales, Study 2 used a forced-choice (or ipsative) measure to assess preference. 
Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. We decided to use a forced-choice measure 
to reflect that preferences are inherently relative: we prefer one thing over another. Having two 
separate measures runs into the danger of respondents indicating high preferences for both, since 
more of a remedy is typically more desirable (we tried to address this problem in Study 1 by 
asking respondents to assume that they could only receive one remedy). In this way, a forced-
choice measure provides a more accurate and realistic measure of preference in a world of 
scarcity in which employees are not likely to receive all the remedies they would like to have. A 
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disadvantage of this approach is that it results in a single dependent variable for statistical 
analysis. Thus, finding that procedural injustice (as compared to interactional injustice) led to a 
stronger preference for an instrumental remedy automatically implies that interactional injustice 
(as compared to procedural injustice) led to a stronger preference for a punitive remedy. 
However, if one considers preferences to be inherently relative, this result is completely sensible 
as the experimental manipulation affected relative preference for one remedy over the other 
remedy.     
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 While past research has revealed a lot about aggrieved workers’ attempts to restore a 
sense of justice through retaliatory and other actions, very little research has examined how 
organizations can initiate efforts to atone for perceived injustice through the help of 
organizational remedies In two studies, using different methodologies, we examined reactions to 
instrumental and punitive remedies after procedural and interactional injustice.  
The results consistently showed that participants’ preferences for organizational remedies 
differed after procedural and interactional injustice. As predicted, procedural injustice was 
particularly associated with preference for an instrumental remedy whereas interactional injustice 
was particularly associated with preference for a punitive remedy. Study 1, a field survey of 
recently terminated employees, found that procedural injustice was positively related to 
preference for an instrumental remedy (monetary compensation) whereas interactional injustice 
was positively related to preference for a punitive remedy (disciplinary action against the 
perpetrator[s] of injustice). In Study 2, a laboratory experiment, we manipulated whether 
participants experienced procedurally or interactionally unfair performance feedback in a 
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business simulation and found that, as expected, the instrumental remedy was preferred more 
over the punitive remedy after procedural injustice than interactional injustice.  
Study 2, measuring injustice perceptions at several points in time during the experiment, 
allowed us to examine not only the effect of injustice type on remedy preferences, but also of 
remedy provision on subsequent justice perceptions (justice restoration). To achieve this, the 
experiment included an additional control condition in which no remedy was provided. The 
experiment provided mixed results with respect to the need for remedies to restore justice 
perceptions. Consistent with predictions, receiving a remedy improved interactional justice 
perceptions as compared to not receiving a remedy when the feedback was interactionally unfair. 
Interestingly, when the injustice was procedural, no effect for remedy provision was found on 
subsequent justice perceptions, which were just as high in the no remedy condition. We believe 
that to understand this result, one needs to consider that in this experiment, participants received 
a single unfair performance feedback on a work task, in between two relatively fair performance 
feedback messages on two other work tasks. The result suggests that a single procedural injustice 
might be more easily forgiven than a single interactional injustice. As can be seen from Figures 
1a and 1b, it was not the case that respective injustice perceptions were affected less by the 
procedural than the interactional injustice manipulation (which a pretest showed to be equally 
severe), ruling out the alternative explanation that there was simply “nothing to be restored” after 
the procedural injustice. Future research should examine the effect of providing remedies after 
repeated injustices. We would expect that in this case provision of remedies will have a 
beneficial impact on justice perceptions after procedural injustice as well.  
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Remedies to Injustice: A Preliminary Taxonomy 
A major assumption in our research is that there are different types of remedies that 
correspond to different human needs threatened by different types of injustice, thus allowing 
organizations to “tailor” their remedy to the injustice that was perceived. We distinguished 
between instrumental and punitive remedies based on the different human justice needs they 
address: whereas instrumental remedies address the instrumental (or control) need, punitive 
remedies address the meaning (or virtue) need (Cropanzano, Byrne et al, 2001). We also focused 
on procedural and interactional injustice in the presence of an unfavorable outcome because of 
the emphasis placed on such situations in fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; 2001) 
and the existing gap in the literature, even though relatively little is known about reactions to 
organizational remedies after distributive injustice (Ohbuchi et al., 1989; O’Malley & Greenberg, 
1983).  
We now develop our model of the relation between human justice needs and type of 
remedy beyond the two studies presented in this paper more fully to include the three major 
needs proposed and the three major types of justice studied (see Table 5). In keeping with the 
work of Cropanzano, Byrne et al. (2001) and Cropanzano, Rupp et al. (2001) we consider three 
major families of justice needs: instrumental (or control), meaning (or virtue), and belonging (or 
interpersonal).  
When the instrumental need has been violated an instrumental remedy, such as monetary 
compensation, is called for. Based on control theory (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; 1978), procedural 
injustice is expected to activate instrumental needs, since it deprives one of control. While the 
process is important and examined here, a copious body of literature indicates the distributive 
injustice also raises instrumental concerns (e.g., Tyler, 1990). In this regard, the impact of 
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distributive unfairness may be even more powerful than that of procedural (Lind & Tyler, 1988). 
Since instrumental concerns have to do with the loss of control, then an appropriate remedy is 
one that restores what is missing through an instrumental remedy. One way to do that would be 
to provide the outcome that was taken away. A different way would be to change the procedures 
in a way to make them fairer, thus giving more control over future valued outcomes. This 
remedy might be especially appropriate in atoning for a procedural injustice.  
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
When the meaning need has been violated a punitive remedy, such as punishment of the 
transgressor, is called for. Based on research indicating that individuals are concerned with moral 
duty (e.g., Folger, 1994; 1998; Folger et al., 2005), interactional justice is expected to activate 
meaning needs.  Meaning, as the term is used here, has to do with moral or what Folger (2001) 
terms “deontic” concerns. Thus, an appropriate remedy following an interactional injustice that 
violated one’s dignity and, thus, threatened one’s moral meaning is one that restores justice 
through a punitive remedy that holds transgressors accountable and has them suffer to atone for 
the injustice.  
A third set of needs, not tested in our two studies, concerns interpersonal affiliation. 
Based on the work of De Cremer and his colleagues (e.g., De Cremer, 2002; De Cremer & 
Alberts, 2004; De Cremer & Leonardelli, 2003, De Cremer & Tyler, 2005) we argue that 
individuals also seek to maintain a sense of belonging to important groups. When the belonging 
need has been violated a socio-emotional remedy, such as a public apology or an overt attempt to 
rebuild the relationship, seems most appropriate. Both procedural and interactional justice should 
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serve to compromise one’s standing with others (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1990). Thus, an 
appropriate remedy would be one that atones for the injustice through an affirmation of social 
standing.  
Parenthetically, it bears mention that Table 5 also illustrates why we did not examine the 
belonging need in these first two tests of our taxonomy. These interpersonal concerns are more 
complex, in that they are engaged by both procedurally and interactionally-relevant events. Thus, 
we could not use need for belonging to distinguish between these two types of injustice. 
Moreover, and as noted earlier, belonging has been more thoroughly examined by previous 
scholars than has the instrumental and meaning needs.  
We have argued that conflict can be restored through organizational remedies. Conflict is 
triggered by the violation of different needs. Depending on which need has been violated, a 
different type of remedy may be most effective in avoiding conflict escalation. While we have 
argued that certain types of fairness violations are typically more likely than others to engage 
certain needs it is also important to realize that any type of injustice could potentially engage any 
and all of these needs under the right circumstances. Consider as a specific example the 
relationship of procedural justice to the meaning need. Based on previous conceptual thinking 
(e.g., Folger & Cropanzano, 1998), we have here argued that interactional justice tends to 
particularly morally charged. In many situations an interactional injustice will register as an 
especially salient and obvious violation of a normative standard. This will often not be true for 
process fairness. While the evidence presented here is consistent with this contention, there may 
well be certain situations in which a procedural injustice clearly violates a moral standard as 
well. Indeed, in his early work on process fairness, Leventhal (1976) explicitly noted that a fair 
process should be consistent with prevailing ethical standards. Future research could explore 
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situations in which the moral aspect of procedures is evident to individuals. In these settings, we 
would anticipate that a procedural injustice might engender a preference for punitive responses, 
much as interactional justice has done in our present studies. 
According to our model, organizational remedies restore justice by addressing general 
human needs such as meaning and belongingness. Further, the model considers remedy provision 
as an attempt to atone for the perceived injustice. We can cautiously attempt to contrast remedies 
with explanations. A considerable amount of research has examined explanations as a way to 
restore justice perceptions (e.g., Bies, 1987; Sitkin & Bies, 1993; cf. Schlenker, 1980; Scott & 
Lyman, 1968). Most attention has been given to justifications and excuses (e.g., Shaw, Wild, & 
Colquitt, 2003). According to fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001) three conditions need 
to be met for injustice to be attributed to a social entity: (1) harm that is (2) attributable to 
someone’s discretionary conduct that (3) violates an applicable moral tenet. Excuses address the 
second condition by denying responsibility for the conduct (Shaw et al, 2003). Justifications do 
not deny responsibility for the act that led to harm, but deny amorality (that a moral tenet has 
been violated) (Shaw et al, 2003).  
Based on this characterization, we can see that remedies and explanations are similar in 
that organizations can use them to restore justice perceptions and avoid retaliatory behaviors and 
escalating conflicts. However, they attempt to do so in different ways. When giving explanations 
a social actor is trying to avoid the attribution of injustice to itself. When offering a remedy, a 
social actor is not denying responsibility, but trying to atone for the injustice instead by 
addressing the human needs that have been threatened and harmed through the injustice. 
(Therefore, we would categorize an apology as a remedy, not an explanation.) Thus, we can say 
that explanations differ in their proximal purposes but may be similar in their distal purposes. 
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The proximal purpose of an explanation is to deflect the attribution of blame, whereas the 
proximal purpose of a remedy is to atone for the injustice. However, in many cases, 
organizations provide explanations and remedies to achieve the distal purpose of restoring 
injustice perceptions and avoiding retaliation. From this perspective, we can understand and 
study remedies and explanations as alternative (and perhaps complementary) tools available to 
organizations.  
Limitations and Future Research 
A strength of the current paper is the consistency of our findings across two widely 
varied methodological approaches and participant populations. In conducting a multimethod 
research project (Campbell & Fiske, 1959), we believe that the use of different methods and 
measures had largely complementary effects and strengthened our research more than it 
potentially introduced confounds. Nevertheless, the two studies are not without limitations. 
First, in Study 2 individuals were given a choice between remedies, whereas in Study 1 
they indicated their expected satisfaction with different remedies. One can wonder whether there 
is any intrinsic benefit in being given a choice. Having a choice of remedies could be perceived 
as more fair and desirable than simply being given a remedy (even if it is one’s most preferred 
type of remedy) and as such improve justice perceptions. In addition, aggrieved workers might 
be somewhat reluctant to choose a punitive remedy (as they seem to have been in our Study 2), 
perhaps out of self-presentational reasons, even though they would be quite happy if the 
organization decided to punish the perpetrator. Future research should examine the advantages 
and disadvantages of being given a choice of remedy versus simply being given a specific 
remedy.  
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Second, Study 1 examined regression coefficients between severity of injustice 
perceptions and preferences for remedies, whereas Study 2 held injustice severity constant at a 
relatively high level. Future research could manipulate both severity and type of injustice to 
examine whether the pattern found in the present experiment at a relatively high level of injustice 
replicates at different levels of severity, or whether severity and type of injustice interact in their 
effects on reactions to organizational remedies. Further, in our studies, we focused on particular 
instances of instrumental and punitive remedies, such as disciplinary action and monetary 
compensation. Clearly, as can be seen from our proposed remedy taxonomy, there are other 
instances of these remedies that we did not examine but that future research should investigate. 
Third, as our dependent variables, we measured preferences for remedies as well as 
justice perceptions subsequent to receiving a remedy or not. As we have described above, we see 
the proximal purpose of a remedy in atoning for the perceived injustice by addressing the 
employee’s needs. In so doing, remedies can restore justice perceptions and eliminate the desire 
to engage in retaliation. The present research only assessed justice perceptions after an injustice 
but not retaliatory behaviors. Future research should investigate the relation between remedy 
provision and retaliatory intentions and behaviors as well as justice perceptions. The two may 
not behave in the same way. For example, it might be possible for a remedy to avoid retaliation 
but not restore justice perceptions because the threshold for engaging in revenge might be higher 
than for revising one’s justice judgments. In this case, bad feelings might remain, but the 
pernicious behaviors are curtailed. We would not advise such an approach, except where sincere 
attempts to address unfairness have already failed. An assumption of this paper is the pernicious 
effects of injustices; an action which caused a reduction of vengeful acts would still leave in 
place the cause of these vengeful acts, injustice. Eventually, the ill-will that remained from this 
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constrained sense of injustice would likely manifest itself in other harmful ways, such as creating 
employee stress (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Benson, 2005).  
Practical Implications 
One can draw several cautious, yet important, practical implications from the present 
research. Retaliation is a common occurrence in organizational life. While not all retaliation is 
necessarily bad (Bies & Tripp 1996), such actions, through a tit-for-tat kind of negative 
reciprocity, often escalate into devastating conflicts. These escalated conflicts can lead to 
immense economic and emotional costs to all parties involved, for example, through subsequent 
litigation. Organizational remedies can be useful in mollifying the sense of injustice and the 
desire to retaliate. However, our results suggest that when it comes to providing remedies, one 
size may not fit all. Rather, the choice of remedy an organization provides should take into 
account which kind of human justice need was violated through the specific injustice the 
aggrieved employee perceived. Specifically, an instrumental remedy, such as monetary 
compensation, may be relatively preferable in response to the violation of the instrumental need 
through a procedural injustice and a punitive remedy, such as disciplinary action, may be 
relatively preferable in response to a violation of the meaning need through an interactional 
injustice. 
Our research shows that organizational remedies can help to improve justice perceptions. 
However, our results also suggest that for single incidents of procedural injustice, it may not be 
necessary to provide a remedy at all in order to restore justice perceptions and avoid retaliation. 
This result highlights a broader issue. From an organization’s perspective, whether a remedy 
should be provided has to be decided within an overall analysis of the (monetary and non-
monetary) costs and benefits to the various parties affected (aggrieved worker, perpetrator, 
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organization) of providing or not providing organizational remedies. Research such as the 
present supplies the kind of knowledge organizational decision makers need to make balanced 
and effective choices about the provision (or not) of organizational remedies. 
Moreover, by implication, this paper suggests that organizational remedies may indeed 
diffuse conflicts between workers and organizational representatives. Since the majority of 
workers experience this representative in the form of their front-line supervisors, organizations 
would be well-advised to train supervisors in conflict management techniques that include 
improved sensitivity to, and understanding of, appropriate matching of the remedy to the 
injustice. 
Conclusion 
We opened this paper by observing the pernicious effects of injustice in stimulating 
destructive workplace conflict. Fortunately, our findings suggest that aggrieved workers of 
injustice are at least open to the possibility of justice restoration by means of organizational 
remedies. Our findings also suggest that the success of an organization’s attempt to restore 
justice depends in part on whether a match exists between the type of injustice the aggrieved 
worker experienced and the kind of remedy that is offered. This research leaves us optimistic that 
attention to the justice restoration needs of employees can mitigate conflicts between employees 
and employers and thereby help to create more humane work environments. Hopefully, the 
present research stimulates further work in the as-of-yet relatively unexplored area of 
organizational remedies to injustice.  
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1  We included gender as a covariate in order to reduce the error variance and because male 
and female participants were unevenly distributed across conditions. Past experiments that also 
used monetary incentives, such as the ultimatum game, have sometimes found gender differences 
(even though there still is debate as to the direction of the difference, see e.g., Eckel & 
Grossman, 1996; Solnik, 2001). 
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Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations among Study 1 Variables 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Time since left job     6.18 2.40 --        
2. Gender      .45 --   .14* --       
3. Age   37.21 11.32   .14* -.06 --      
4. Race       .83 -- -.12* -.06 -.15* --     
5. EEOC claim        .58 --    .26** .02 .15* -.04 --    
6. Procedural injustice     5.26 1.71 .08   .15* .10 -.10 .25** (.89)   
7. Interactional injustice     5.23 1.82 .12   .13* .09 -.05 .21** .62** (.90)  
8. Preference for  
    instrumental remedy 
    3.81 1.17 .08 -.07 .16* .06 .25** .23** .17* (.69)
9. Preference for  
    punitive remedy 
    3.85 1.25 .05 .01 .09 .05 .23** .23** .25** .43**
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. Coefficient alphas in parentheses where applicable.  
Notes: All injustice measures were taken on 7-point scales (1-7) with higher values indicating 
higher perceived injustice. Preference for remedies was measured on 5-point scales (1-5). Gender 
was coded 0: male, 1: female. Race was coded 0: White, 1: minority member; EEOC claim was 
coded 0: no claim filed, 1: claim filed.  
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Table 2: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Preference for Instrumental Remedy as 
Dependent Variable, Study 1 
 Step 1 Step 2 
 B SE B β t-value B SE B β t-value 
Constant 2.81 .39  7.18** 3.32 .43  7.73** 
Time since left job .02 .03 .03 .43 .02 .03 .03 .49 
Gender -.25 .16 -.11 -1.59 -.30 .15 -.13 -1.95 
Age .01 .01 .14 2.02* .01 .01 .12 1.78 
Race .29 .21 .10 1.38 .31 .20 .10 1.51 
EEOC claim .51 .16 .22 3.13** .41 .17 .18 2.47* 
Procedural injustice     .14 .06 .20 2.31* 
Interactional injustice     .01 .05 .01 .14 
R2    .10**    .14** 
∆R2        .04* 
 
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01 
Notes: Gender was coded 0: male, 1: female. Race was coded 0: White, 1: minority member. 
EEOC claim was coded 0: no claim filed, 1: claim filed.  
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Table 3: Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Preference for Punitive Remedy as Dependent 
Variable, Study 1 
 Step 1 Step 2 
 B SE B β t-value B SE B β t-value 
Constant 3.04 .45  6.81** 3.79 .48  7.87** 
Time since left job -.01 .04 -.01 -.14 -.01 .04 -.02 -.23 
Gender .01 .18 .01 .06 -.05 .17 -.02 -.26 
Age .01 .01 .06 .81 .00 .01 .04 .54 
Race .23 .24 .07 .96 .27 .23 .08 1.15 
EEOC claim .62 .19 .24 3.32** .47 .19 .18 2.49* 
Procedural injustice     .08 .07 .11 1.28 
Interactional injustice     .12 .06 .17 2.03* 
R2    .06*    .12** 
∆R2        .06** 
 
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01 
Notes: Gender was coded 0: male, 1: female. Race was coded 0: White, 1: minority member. 
EEOC claim was coded 0: no claim filed, 1: claim filed.  
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Table 4: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations among Study 2 Variables 
 
 M SD N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Remedy condition .32 -- 114   
2. Type of injustice .48 -- 114 -.09     
3. Relative preference  50.36 46.25 78 (a) .24*    
4. IIJ Time 1 2.44 .92 113 .03 -.01 -.01   
5. PIJ Time 1 2.89 1.04 114 -.09 .02 -.07 .59**   
6. IIJ Time 2 4.98 1.57 114 .05 .10 -.16 .19 .27**  
7. PIJ Time 2 5.21 1.50 112 .13 -.05 .17 -.09 .14 .30** 
8. IIJ Time 3 3.35 1.39 114 .22* -.06 .09 .16 .02 .31** .12
9. PIJ Time 3 3.37 1.45 114 .06 .13 -.14 .09 .21* .13 .13 .53**
 
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01.  
(a)  Cannot be computed because no remedy was given in the no remedy condition. 
Notes: IIJ: interactional injustice perceptions; PIJ: procedural injustice perceptions 
Relative preference indicates relative preference for instrumental remedy over punitive remedy 
(100 to -100). Remedy condition was coded as 0: remedy provided, 1: no remedy provided. Type 
of injustice was coded as 0: procedural injustice, 1: interactional injustice. 
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Table 5: A Taxonomy of Organizational Remedies Based on the Multiple Needs Model of 
Justice 
 
Need Violated Type of Remedy Purpose of Remedy Example of Remedy 
 
Instrumental               
(or Control) 
 
 
 
Instrumental 
 
Restore lost control over 
outcomes 
 
Providing monetary 
compensation 
Meaning  
(or Virtue) 
 
 
Punitive Restore sense  
of morality 
Punishing     
transgressor 
Belonging            
(or Interpersonal) 
 
Socio-Emotional Affirm social standing 
and restore group identity 
Giving                 
public apology 
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Figure 1: Injustice Perceptions Depending on Injustice Condition, Remedy Condition and Time 
of Measurement, Study 2 
Figure 1a: Procedural Injustice Condition 
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Figure 1b: Interactional Injustice Condition 
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